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19th-century France has often been described either as totally centralized, with an 
already strong State, or as lacking any kind of economic regulation after the abolition of 
guilds and quality norms during the Revolution. During the last 15 years, however, 
historians have demonstrated the influence and efficiency of various meso-level 
“institutions” (in the loose sense of the word), including family firms as well as notaries, 
conseils de prud’hommes (arbitration boards between employers and employees) and 
Chambers of Commerce (Hirsch, 1991, Plessis (ed.), 1993, Hirsch and Minard, 1998, 
Hoffman et al., 2000, Cottereau, 2002). My own PhD thesis about the Paris Chamber of 
Commerce in the 19th century (Lemercier, 2003) and my current research dealing with a 
broader system of meso-level economic institutions aim at going one step further. What 
remains to be done is to investigate the relationships between different possible forms 
of social organization, from the most private ones (like marriage strategies) to the most 
formalized ones (like the Bank of France or Commercial Courts). Each form of 
organization provides a different answer to general economic problems such as access 
to information or transaction costs reduction. Mixing network strategies and institutional 
strategies may sometimes increase the total benefit for a given firm or entrepreneur: for 
example, a good matrimonial choice may make the election to an advisory board 
easier; then, inside this institution, members are able to establish new private links – in 
addition to getting insider information. But “network” and “institutional” strategies may 
also be seen as alternatives, for example when unions try to provide information and 
services to merchants who lack good personal connections. 
To understand the dynamics of such networks and institutions, sometimes acting in 
synergy, sometimes competing with each other, I gathered data on 822 members of 
Parisian economic institutions between 1800 and 1871 (Chamber of Commerce, 
Commercial Court, boards of the Bank of France, Municipal Council), most of whom 
were at the same time bankers, merchants and/or industrialists. These data include 
information on individual “institutional careers” and on private ties (family ties and 
business partnerships). On the basis of this database and of general historical 
knowledge on these institutions, I will try to assess the changing weight of private ties 
on individual institutional careers, at the same time questioning the existence of firm-
level or family-level strategies to control economic institutions.  
Part I of the paper gives an introduction to the case study, describing each institution 
and the economic advantages that it provided to its members. Part II describes the 
data, the general pattern of private ties between institution members and the evolution 
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of this network (its construction and then its fading after the 1840s). Part III discusses 
the centralization of this network around the “high bank” and its meaning in terms of 
individual careers. Part IV finally tries to explain the changing complementarity between 
private networks and meso-level institutions, taking into account institutional 
specialization, new elite strategies and the birth of a new kind of organization, the 
chambre syndicale. 
 
I- Firms, institutions and general interest. 
Five Parisian meso-level economic institutions.  
This paper is part of a broader study of meso-level economic institutions in the 
French 19th century. By “meso-level”, I mean institutions that were neither a real part of 
the administration nor spontaneous businessmen or employers unions (corps 
intermédiaires in French – see Chatriot and Lemercier, 2002). They enjoyed an official 
status but their members were not civil servants. They were not paid for their part-time 
institutional activity and they went on with their profession or business. Especially in the 
case of businessmen, this leads to two connected questions: why did they accept such 
positionsii? If it is, at least partly, because they thought that it would improve their 
business position, does it follow that these institutions were nothing more than the 
expression of private interests? This is a very important issue because such institutions 
participated in decisions on economic policies at a national level (they were asked for 
advice or they spontaneously advocated particular decisions) and/or in the creation and 
enforcement of local norms (specific for a town and/or a branch). 
From the point of view of the relationships between networks and institutions, such a 
situation may lead to various patterns. Meso-level institutions could act independantly 
from any “private”, more informal network (the republican ideal) or they could be the 
mere voice of such private networks (the conspiracy theory, that was often used to 
criticize such institutions). But we can also imagine more mixed or dynamic situations. 
Institutions may well have been the place where different “networks” met and looked for 
a balance between their interests (institutions would create a weak tie between clusters 
of strong ties). If some institutions proved more efficient than private ties for particular 
tasks, their success may have weakened the private network; but if they added nothing 
to what the network already provided, persons without efficient private ties only would 
have accepted membership – which might in turn change the institution’s position, etc. 
The aim of my empirical study is to find which of such models gives the best description 
of what happened in 19th-century Paris. 
I must begin with a short presentation of the institutions studied, in order to show 
why being a member may have been useful for a firm or an individual entrepreneur. 
Five institutionsiii were chosen because my study of the Chamber of Commerce showed 
that they shared many members and that they communicated in various ways 
(coordinated campaigns, mutual information, common committees…). Each institution 
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included 10 to 60 members. Their work was collegial. The members were very reluctant 
to admit the idea of a balance of interests (such an idea was almost taboo in French 
political thought during the century after the Revolution, see Rosanvallon, 2004) and 
they generally refused to describe themselves as representatives of anything. It was 
only after 1867, when the employers unions (chambres syndicales, see below) had 
gained influence in Paris, that the commercial judges and the members of the Chamber 
of Commerce were explicitly chosen as representatives of a given trade (Lemercier, 
2003). There were obviously forms of representation of interests (of various scales and 
sorts) and balance of interests before 1867, but they could only with great difficulties be 
mentioned as such. The idea of disinterestedness, of giving some time for public 
service, of working for the general interest of the economy, was omnipresent in 
contemporary descriptions of the five institutions. It placed their members in a double 
bind: they were elected or appointed as businessmen, because they were currently 
involved in business, which gave them specific skills and knowledge of other 
businessmen’s reputation, wishes, problems, etc. But at the same time they were 
expected to use the language of general interest and not to speak as lobbyists for their 
particular firm or trade. “In the name of whom do the members speak/act?” is a key 
question to understand the new institutional system created after the Revolution and 
based on the abolition of specific guilds. Do members fight for general interest 
(variously defined), for their firm and/or family, for a branch opposed to another one 
(cotton vs. wool, cotton spinning vs. cotton weaving etc.), for a particular place, for the 
employers or for the bourgeoisie? This political problem is tied to the question of the 
relationships between private networks and institutions. 
The Commercial Court (Tribunal de commerce) 
It was created in the 16th century to judge commercial disputes (usually between 
merchants) and it was only slightly reformed during the Revolutioniv. The Paris Court 
often influenced the evolution of national commercial law, not only through 
jurisprudence but also by advocating reforms and by being sought for advice. 
Commercial judges were active (or, for a small proportion of them, retired) merchants, 
bankers or industrialists. From 1790 to 1807 and from 1848 to 1851, they were elected 
by all persons paying a trade tax in Paris. In the other periods, they were elected by 
several hundreds of notables commerçants who were themselves chosen by the Préfet 
(who generally asked for, and followed, the advice of the Chamber of Commerce) with 
no formal criteria, but with the idea that they should have the best possible reputation: it 
was a kind of elite built by cooptation. 
Corruption and favoritism were obvious risks in a court with merchant judges, but 
they were limited by internal rules and by the possibility to appeal judgements to a 
higher court including professional judges. Therefore, the advantage of being a judge 
was probably not that you could always take the best decision for you and your friends – 
even if it was possible in some cases. But you could probably learn a lot about what to 
do and not to do, about who was to be trusted and about the state of each economic 
branch by seeing thousands of cases and hundreds of bankruptcies each year. In 
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addition, being chosen as a notable and then as a judge increased your reputation (such 
qualities were used in advertising), especially in middle-size business. 
The Municipal Council  
During the Revolution, a uniform system of local administration with elected councils 
was created. But Paris remained an exceptionv. The Parisian Council had less decision 
power than in other cities, because the Préfet’s authority remained very strong. But the 
Council had at least some influence on economic issues such as the choice of location 
for new equipments (canals, warehouses…) or the organization of some trades (bakery, 
butchery...). Most of the time, municipal councilors were appointed by the government, 
the only exception being between 1834 and 1847, when they were elected by the 
wealthiest citizens. Of course not all councilors were businessmen, but some were. As 
an entrepreneur, becoming a councilor gave you access to speculative information 
(about future streets, train stations, canals...) and allowed you to get in touch with 
various parts of public administration. In addition, it could probably help to get 
procurement contracts, at a time when their rules were not too strict. 
The General Board (conseil général, also called conseil de régence) of the Bank of 
France (GBBF)  
It was created in 1800, like the Bank itself. It included three censeurs and fifteen 
régents and, after 1806, a governor and two subgovernorsvi. It defined the Bank’s 
general policy (e.g. the level of interest rates or the creation of new types of banknotes) 
and it answered to the firms’ particular credit requests. During the century, the Bank’s 
field of action became more and more national (as opposed to Parisian), but the 
members of the GBBF had to live in Paris. The governor and subgovernor were 
appointed by the government, whereas the régents and censeurs were elected by the 
Bank’s most important shareholders. The turnover was slower in the GBBF than in the 
other institutions considered here: changes only happened when a member died or 
resigned. In such cases, a candidate supported by the GBBF would often – but not 
always – be elected. Being a member of the GBBF allowed to directly influence the 
French financial policy, in general and vis-à-vis specific firms. It was probably the best 
place to get information about the liability of all major firms. 
The Discount Council of the Bank of France (conseil d’escompte) 
It was created in 1803. Its role was to decide whether the Bank would accept each 
commercial paper presented by a Parisian firm. The members of the Discount Council 
were therefore expected to have in-depth knowledge of the reputation of each firm. 
They were appointed by the GBBF. Whereas most GBBF members were bankers, the 
discount councilors were generally specialized merchants or industrialists (some trades 
being nearly always present, like wood trade or bookselling). The frontier between the 
two institutions, however, was not hermetic: no less than 25% of discount councilors 
became régents or censeurs of the GBBF. The members could get in-depth knowledge 
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of the state of Parisian firms and they could influence the choice of firms which were 
given credit. 
The Chamber of Commerce 
The Paris Chamber of Commerce was created in 1803. There were Chambers of 
Commerce in the Ancien Régime, but not in Paris. They were abolished in 1791 along 
with the guilds. When they were re-established, their role was – in theory – only 
advisory. In fact, some of the Chambers regained their previous powers to administer 
local equipments and services and to define local norms. In Paris, the Chamber was 
above all an important source of advice and statistical information for the government 
as well as for local Préfets. Advice and statistics obviously could be biased in favor of 
one branch or firm, even if the Chamber generally adopted the language of general 
interest. Given that the authorities did not have many alternative sources of 
information, the Chamber influenced many decisions. In addition, from the 1840s 
onwards, the institution began to create or to administer equipments for merchants such 
as a library or warehouses. The first members were elected by a few businessmen who 
had themselves been chosen by the Préfet de la Seine. Their followers were chosen by 
means of pure cooptation up to 1832vii. Then they were elected by 50 to 60 persons, 
including the outgoing Chamber but also the commercial judges and a few other voters 
chosen by the outgoing Chamber and the judges. In 1849, for one election of the whole 
Chamber, all persons having paid a trade tax for a few years could vote. After 1852, the 
Chamber was elected by the same notables commerçants who voted for the 
Commercial Court. 
Being a member of the Chamber made you part of practically every decision-making 
process in economic policy (national as well as local), which means that you had access 
to lots of insider information, particularly about what the government was planning to do 
in the next months. In addition, you could try to lobby for your economic sector, but you 
had to do it indirectly: direct claims in favor of one given branch where not part of the 
institution’s rhetoric. But if you were able to translate your firm’s or sector’s interest in 
terms of general interest of the French economy and to convince the other members, 
you would be able to get what you wanted. 
For each of the meso-level institutions studied here, there are good reasons to think 
that being a member could be good for your business. But we have to consider that it 
was also time-consuming and that there were alternative means to get information, 
reputation or influence. Direct lobbying toward the administration and private ties 
(marriage etc.) with local or national authorities were one of these means. It is difficult 
to compare their efficiency to that of being present in the institutions. But it is also 
difficult to find a prominent business family, known for its private links with the State, 
that was totally absent from the institutions studied here. Apart from such relationships 
with the administration, the economic elite also benefitted from internal networks. 
Before the age of the modern communication means, correspondents in provincial or 
foreign cities (who were often part of the family) played a very important role in banking 
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and commerce; before the expansion of joint stock companies, family firms were a 
majority in most industrial branches (Hirsch, 1991). What will be considered here is the 
interaction between such private networks and institutions: do the members of such 
networks use institutions as a complementary tool – for which networks and which 
institutions is this true? 
 
II- Private ties among institution members: a general description 
Network data 
If we want to study the relationships between private networks and institutions, we 
have to define the private networks we are interested in, and it is not an easy task. In 
some well-documented individual cases, it may be possible to stress for example which 
uncle helped the person to become a member of an institution and why this 
membership was useful to the family firmviii. In another case, we may discover the 
economic and institutional utility of classmates or very remote kin. But such narratives 
convey two risks. First, if we do not have an a priori definition of a tie, we will probably 
always find network explanations of anything, since each pair of prominent 
entrepreneurs probably have some kind of tie, if we allow very weak and indirect ties. 
But then the question is: Why are some very weak ties efficient, while the great majority 
are not? The second problem is a problem of symmetry and of historical information. Is 
our well-documented case typical? Aren’t we more reluctant to give a narrative about 
an entrepreneur without well-known private ties in the milieu? To give a general view of 
the networks between all members of meso-level institutions helps to consider the 
entrepreneurs with less links and those without memoirs and biographs. Since I wanted 
to reach such a general view, I had to define what I meant by “private tie” and to 
concentrate on the strongest ties in order to get reasonably complete information. I 
included first and second degree blood ties (father-son, cousins...), but also marriage 
ties between lineages and economic partnerships above a given duration and 
importance. Such borders are more intuitive, but I tried to concentrate on the strongest 
ties and to keep homogenous criteria. For example, in “marriage ties”, I included not 
only the common case of father-in-law-son-in-law links but also everything that I 
considered to be recent and well-known alliances between two lineages. 
I will treat those different kinds of ties simultaneously, even if this choice is 
questionable. The underlying question is: do members of the same family share the 
same economic interests (since it is obvious for partners)?ix The answer was not 
obvious for the actors themselves, as is shown by the discussion of a project forbidding 
the simultaneous election of close relatives or associates in Chambers of commerce 
(Chambre de Commerce de Paris, 1850). In the case of the commercial courts, a 1810 
law (still enforced in the 1860s) enacted a compulsory king’s authorization for relatives 
(by blood or marriage) at the first and second degree to be judges in the same court, 
even if the alliance followed the electionx. My decision to include both kinds of strong 
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ties is due to the important place of family firms in the 19th-century; Jean-Pierre Hirsch 
has described partnership as a “ complementary instrument of family strategies, used to 
settle those questions not already resolved by means of marriage; for it encompassed 
other sectors of the family domain and for different lengths of time ” (Hirsch, 1991). 
This phenomenon is not specifically French: even in places where it was easier to 
create a bank under the form of a stock company, commercial banks appeared as “the 
financial arms of extended kinship networks” (Lamoreaux, 1986).  
My dataset includes all the men who were members of at least one of the five 
institutions examined in this paper at least for a few months between 1800 and 1871. 
1871 was chosen because of the change in the political regime and because the 
chambres syndicales (employers unions) took control of the elections to the Chamber 
and the Court from ca. 1867 on, which opened a new period. For the more dynamic part 
of the study, the 822 men in the dataset were classified in 4 groups (“periods” or 
“generations”) according to the date of their first election or appointment in one of the 
institutions considered here: 1785-1803 (when most of the institutions were created or 
reformed) for 92 of them, 1804-1831 for 253, 1832-1848 for 275 and 1849-1871 for 
294. 1831 and 1848 are years of political changes and reforms in the appointment 
procedures of some of the institutions (with an important turnover). 
Some of these men are already well-known thanks to historians who found and 
published invaluable information about their kinship and economic ties (in addition to 
those already cited, Gille, 1959, Bergeron, 1978 and Chassagne, 1991 were among the 
most useful for me). A majority of my network data comes from these studies, although 
I found additional ties in archival records and I am still trying to improve my 
information. This means that this information is slightly asymmetric depending on 
periods and institutions. But the strucure that I found seems very robust to small 
changes in the data. 
A general, static view: a very heterogenous network 
If we only consider first-degree kinship ties (father-son, brothers), we can distinguish 
33 family groups of 2 to 4 men including only 9% of the population. In the vast majority 
of cases, we know that these men were associates too, at least for a part of their life. 
Such strong ties (which in fact mix successions, indirect successions and simultaneous 
involvements in the same or in several institutions) seem to be very unusual among the 
members of meso-level institutions. The picture shows little change if we add more 
remote but still close kinship ties (grandfather-grandson, uncle-nephew, cousins). We 
then see 42 groups of 2 to 5 men, including 13% of the population. But a dramatic 
change appears if we include marriage ties as well as blood ties (graph 1)xi. 38 
components including 2 to 65 men – all together, 24% of the population – appear. As 
for partnership ties (graph 2), 15% of the men considered here have at least one such 
tie inside the population. The graph shows one very large component with 68 members 
and 23 other groups of 2 to 4 simultaneous or successive associates. 
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15% of the ties between relatives by marriage are at the same time association ties; 
22% of the associations unite allied lineages. It is difficult to comment on the magnitude 
of these figures because of the lack of comparable studies, but we should bear in mind 
first, that the majority of the private ties between institutions members are “not so 
strong” and second, that we deal with two distinct kinds of ties in the majority of cases. 
Graphs 1 and 2 nevertheless show similar pictures, with one large and complex core 
“network” (or, more precisely speaking, “component”), many small groups and a 
majority of isolates. 24 men appear in the main component of the kinship network as 
well as in the main component of the partnership network. The two components are 
therefore not exactly the same. For example, Laffitte used association more than 
alliance, at least with people involved in economic institutions: he may have used 
alliance to create ties with other milieus. But we find the same kind of people, namely 
high bank families, at the core of each network, which gives an incentive to mix them 
and to describe the global network. 
Here it is important to stop and wonder what such large groups (or “private 
networks”) could mean for their members. Were they conscious of the existence of 
such structures? Did they share something (interests?) or did they exchange something 
(information?) preferentially inside such groups? The answer is not obvious, as the 
groups vary in density. It seems obvious that Latteux and Pénicaud did not consider 
each other as relatives and they probably did not even know that a path could be 
retraced between them. But qualitative evidencexii shows that sometimes, 4 or 5 
degrees of separation seem a short path. And it is probably even more the case if a 
redundancy exists, creating “cliques” in terms of network analysisxiii, like in some parts 
of the largest component, for example around the Delessert or the Davillier families. In 
fact, in each network, the large component seems to be a mix of cliques (which often 
describe family firms) and bridges built by particular individuals, such as Jean-Baptiste 
Say. In this case, his economic activities were second to his intellectual work and did 
not last very long, but can we say that this bridge must be ignored? With many similar 
ones, it builds, in the whole network (graph 3), a quite dense component with few weak 
points (erasing one or a few people would not be sufficient to destroy it)xiv. 
If we mix all kinds of ties, we find one large component with 132 individuals (16% of 
the population), 31 smaller components with 2 to 9 members and 586 complete 
isolates, who represent 70% of the population (graph 3). We must therefore bear in 
mind two facts. On the one hand, a large majority of the members of economic 
institutions are not even remotely linked to any of their “colleagues” – if we take kinship 
ties and strong economic ties into account. On the other hand, many of the small, 
densely tied family/firm groups are merged in one large component whose members 
are probably not aware of its general structure, but which also very probably constitutes 
a dense milieu where many things – information above all – are exchanged. 
This component is something specific: on the contrary, the majority of small family 
groups remain isolated. Here we have something to interpret that is neither a family nor 
a group of people only defined by objective attributes, but a set of – even remotely – 
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interconnected persons. This component doesn’t necessarily have a collective strategy, 
but it probably influences individual economic and institutional careers. The fact that 
many well-known “high bank” families are part of this component reminds us of the 
flexibility of partnerships in this economic sector (although ties like “being directors of 
the same stock company” are not included) and of the fact that high bank is connected 
to more specialized merchants or industrialists (coal and iron merchants, forge and 
mine owners, wool, wood or wine merchants…) as well as to economists. A network-
oriented view of the “high bank” may help to a better understanding both of this 
particular sector and of the world of meso-level institutions. The history of the “high 
bank” itself, gaining influence after 1815 thanks to the government loans and 
confronting “new banks” after 1848, has therefore to be considered (Plessis, 1985, 
Bergeron, 1991, Stoskopf, 2002). Is it correlated to the co-evolution of networks and 
institutions? 
The construction and deconstruction of the network 
There are several ways to create a more dynamic view of the “network of private 
ties in institutions” that we consider here. Graphs 4 to 7 use a partition of the population 
in four periods according to the first date of election or appointment to any institution 
(1785-1803, 1804-1831, 1832-1848, and 1849-1871). The first generation mostly shows 
small chains, but the 16-persons component already encompasses people who then 
became the skeleton of the large component of the whole network: the Perier and 
Delessert families were already linked by other bankers. But connections with the 
Ternaux-Moreau group (more specialized merchants and industrialists), the Davilliers 
and the group of intermarried régents around Delon remained to be created – or, if 
some of these connections already existed by the virtue of alliance or association, they 
passed through men without any institutional role at the very beginning of the century. 
The second period may be viewed as a time of construction and stabilization of the 
new (or reformed) institutions: their roles were gradually defined and their existence and 
functions became common knowledge for the economic elite. The graph shows a 
dramatic increase in the number of members of the network’s main component. In 
1831, two thirds of the final large component already existed. Its form and subgroups 
were already stabilized, even if some connections were weak (with little redundancy). 
Some of the new members entered pre-existing cliques in the component (they appear 
as followers), while others, like Antoine Odier or Michel Frédéric Pillet-Will, created new 
links between subgroups and therefore shaped the new large component. Qualitative 
knowledge of the data shows that the component was at the same time built by these 
new men (maybe elected because they were common relatives or associates of several 
already present small groups) and by new ties (new partnerships and new marriages): 
the milieu defined by the large component was at the same time uniting and self-
recruiting for the institutional positions. This double evolution was very important for the 
institutional system: from the 253 “new men” of the second period, 23% (55 persons) 
fell into the large component.  
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On the contrary, the third and fourth periods not only added less people to the large 
component, but they did not modify its structure, the new men/ties very often being 
redundant to older ones. Only 6 to 8% of the new men fell in the large component and 
they only increased its density instead of reshaping it. It is also noticeable that the 
smaller components exhibit few new family or firm groups. Moving to statistical 
accounts of the same reality confirms the existence of a dramatic change at the 
beginning of the 1830’s and of an even stronger tendency to isolation after 1848. Table 
1 shows the decrease of private ties among newcomers: it affects every kind of tie as 
well as the network degree. Complete isolates replace members of the component. This 
phenomenon points at an evolution of the whole business relational system as well as 
of the role and identity of each economic institution.  
To get a better idea of differences between institutions, we can use a few snapshots 
(only including members in charge in a given year). As table 2 sums it up, the density of 
ties inside the institutional world shows a decrease, but with important differences 
among institutions. The Chamber of Commerce falls from a very high integration of its 
members in the institutional world to figures around average, whereas the GBBF 
experiences an increase in ties that goes contrary to the general tendency, but that 
stops abruptly in the last period. Comparing the 1820s and the 1860s is particularly 
interesting. The 1823 graph (graph 8) includes, with 15 men, a significant part of the 
large componentxv. Together they hold 8 of the 18 elected positions in the GBBF and 6 
of the 15 positions in the Chamber of Commerce, so that they are not far from forming 
a majority – not to mention 3 of the 12 positions in the Discount Council, 3 of 24 in the 
Municipal Council and 1 of 25 in the Commercial Court. This group, in which bankers 
are an overwhelming majority, seems to have an eye everywhere and a significant 
influence on two major institutions. But is it a group? The pivotal place of Roux and 
Laffitte in it is unquestionable. The 1820s is the time of the “canals fever” and other 
speculations of the same sort, involving what is often called “saint-simonian banking” 
and implying changing configurations of partnerships. Therefore, even if they may 
compete sometimes, it may well be thought that these men share some common 
interests and work together to promote them, particularly in the Chamber of Commerce, 
which is often asked for advice on questions related to canals. In 1863 (graph 9), the 
situation looks very differentxvi. The components are smaller and less dense and the 
only institution including more than two tied members is the General Board of the Bank 
of France.  
Finally, table 3 gives a more precise account of the weight of each type of “network-
profile” in each institution. It is built in terms of member-years in each period, allowing 
to include all members at the time and not only the newcomers and to take durations of 
stay into account. It confirms that even if “isolated” men practically always formed a 
majority in the Commercial Court and in the Municipal Council – probably above all 
because these institutions found their members in more various social circles –, there 
was, even there, a clear tendency towards less network integration. It also underlines 
the importance of the 1832 change in the Chamber of Commerce and in the Discount 




magnitudexvii. Has the GBBF become the only useful meso-level institution for the 
promotion of the interests of high bank families? Or is it the only institution where they 
still have an easy access, which would mean that networks are no longer important 
factors to be elected elsewhere? 
 
III- High bank, private networks and institutional careers 
The existence of ties in the institutional world suggests two interpretations. First, the 
men who are chosen to become new members (or a part of them, as a majority are 
isolates) are somehow tied to previous members of the institution where they enter or of 
other institutions. It means that (strong) ties sometimes help to get a position: the 
market for institutional positions may be compared to the market for jobs, and we may 
study the role of social capital in such careers. But we also have to consider the fact 
that the person accepts to be chosen and to spend some time in the institution. We may 
wonder if people choose their relatives or associates only because they know their 
qualities, or to help them in an individual career, or also because they want to exercise 
some kind of collective influence on the institutions (a deliberate network strategy). And 
if private networks have such strategies, they are only efficient if more powerful 
strategies do not oppose them. We must consider both points of view if we want to 
understand the evolution of the whole system. 
A network centered on the high bank 
May we define the large component of the global network as “the high bank”? Even 
if some high bank families are to be found in smaller components (like the Foulds), it is 
noticeable that no high bank family of the first generation (as defined by Bergeron, 
1991) is either totally absent from the institutions or isolated from the point of view of 
private links between institutions members. Only for the members of the Chamber of 
Commerce and the councils of the Bank of France do I have homogenous data about 
their business activity. I classified them as “bankers” if they were at least one time 
defined as bankers in contemporary recordsxviii, “merchants” if they were at least one 
time defined as “négociants”, a word associated with the idea of a non-specialized, 
large scale trade, and “specialists” if they were always defined by a specialty (e.g. wine 
or iron), either as merchants or as industrialists. The members of the Chamber of 
Commerce have a mean degree of 2.7 in my datasetxix, but the bankers among them 
have a mean degree of 5.6, compared to 1.3 for merchants and 1.6 for specialists. 
Three quarters of the bankers belong to the large component, compared to less than 
one third of the others. And only 12% of the bankers are isolates, compared to half of 
the others. These differences hold for each of the periods. In the GBBF too, three 
quarters of the bankers (but also two thirds of the merchants) belong to the large 
component, compared to one quarter of the others. In the Discount Council, the 




On the other hand, the largest component is not only “the high bank”. From the 69 
members of the Chamber of Commerce who are part of it, only half called themselves 
bankers, at least sometimes (and not all of them were part of the high bank families as 
defined by Bergeron, 1991). The same is true for the 63 members of the GBBF in the 
component (often the same persons, in fact). But the bankers are the core of the 
component, according to any measure of “centrality”. For example, we may wonder how 
many of the component members each man can “reach” by a path of length two (with 
one or two ties between them). The mean figure for the Chamber members is 15, but it 
is 22 for the bankers and 12 for the others. With the maximum reachability at level two 
(20 to 45 reachable persons), we find bankers, but also Vital Roux, Jean-Baptiste Say 
and Jean-Baptiste Chaptal. They are merchants or industrialists and not bankers, but 
above all they play a very important role in the birth of business schools and in saint-
simonian networks. The group that seems to weigh most on economic institutions is 
united by these persons and not only around prominent high bank families.  
We have to understand both the weight of this group, with its internal strong and 
weaker ties, in the institutions, and the limits of this weight, since the large component 
is always a minority and seems to gradually disappear after 1832. Many of the 
members of a private network built around the “high bank” chose to invest time in 
meso-level institutions – and succeeded in being chosen as members – at a given time, 
but then, either they were less interested in institutions or they were less successful in 
their careers. 
Private networks and institutional careers 
The concept of an institutional career seems useful to understand their behaviour. 
There is a correlation between being a member or the large component and holding 
multiple institutional positions. 35% of the men with at least two positions are part of the 
largest component (and 55% of those with at least three positions) whereas only 43% 
(resp. 22%) are isolates. Here we must probably consider at the same time the 
economic rewards of institutional participation, but also more individual and abstract 
rewards, in terms of prestige and access to other types of positions. Historians of the 
19th century elite have shown the importance of philanthropic activies or of collecting 
pictures, for example, for bankers or industrialists (among others, Bergeron, 1991). 
Being involved in meso-level economic institutions seems to be partly related to the 
same taste for fonctions gratuites, non-utilitarian activities; at the same time, it provides 
economic advantages. Finally, some less prestigious positions may be understood as a 
first step in a career. 
The members of the largest component seem to have had the best institutional 
career opportunities. They spent an average 13.2 years as members of at least one of 
the institutions considered in this paperxx, compared to 11.8 years for members of 
smaller components and 6.5 years for isolates. That’s why the large component, with 
only 16% of the population, provides 30% of the years spent by members in the 
institutions, while the 70% of isolates only account for 52% of years spent. The fact of 
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having at least one tie in the world of institutions therefore seems useful. Having a large 
degree, in networks terms, also has a specific effect: the men with one or two ties 
spend an average 11 years in the institutions, compared to 12.6 for those with three or 
four ties and 15.6 for the 54 men with five to fifteen ties. The degree seems here more 
significant than the fact of belonging to the large component. 
If we look at careers in each institution separately, the figures are less clear. The 
main effect of private ties seems to be an easier transition from one institution to 
another, more than re-election in the same institution. Each one shows a specific 
pattern. In the Commercial Court, the lowest average durations are found among 
members of the large component (3.5 years, compared to a general mean of 4 years) 
and among men with at least 5 ties (3.2 years). And they do not have more chances 
than the others to become president of the Commercial Court. On the other hand, in the 
GBBF, the average duration of stay is 8.5 years for isolates, 11.8 years for members of 
small groups, 18 years for members of the large component and 20.9 years for people 
with at least 5 ties inside the large component. It seems partly due to an entry at a lower 
age (especially after 1832 and even more after 1848). In the Chamber of Commerce, in 
each period, we also find a lower age of election (two or three years under average) for 
members of the large component, but they don’t stay longer in the Chamber. Re-
election seems to be more correlated with real involvement in the institutions’ activityxxi. 
This points in the direction of a hierarchy of institutions, at least from the point of 
view of members of the large component. If you have many ties, you will invest less 
time and involvement in institutions like the Commercial Court (the role of judge is very 
time-consuming, not very prestigious and a majority of cases deal with small, local 
trade), but you somehow need to begin with this kind of position, even if your network 
also helps you to enter places like the GBBF at a lower age. It seems (from career 
paths and qualitative evidence) that the Commercial Court was considered by members 
of prominent families as a compulsory first step, sometimes described as a stage 
[traineeship], to improve their skills and to gain reputation. The Chamber of Commerce 
was somewhere in the middle of the hierarchy, between more local and more political 
institutionsxxii. It was probably a first step for some members and an achievement in 
itself for others. 
Giving such details is useful to show that the effect of networks is by no means 
uniform. It dispels the too simple idea that “capital goes to capital”, that any kind of 
resource may be transformed to any other kind and that every individual’s aim is to hold 
every possible position. Each group probably has a specific institutional strategy and 
the evolution of the institutions’ roles and appointment procedures may induce changes 
in priorities. It is only thanks to a comprehensive study of the system of institutions, 
including economic, social and political perspectives and taking into account the scales 
of individual, group and institution that we may be able to interpret such results.  
Having many private ties in the world of economic institutions may have provided a 
more various institutional career to an individual and sometimes allowed him to start it 
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at an earlier age. Family reputation or support from inside the institution (in a context of 
cooptation) appear as substitutes for personal experience in business, skill in writing, 
etc. The lack of any official certification of economic skills or knowledge (there were few 
business schools and law faculties practically didn’t teach commercial law or economics 
before the 1870s, see Le Van-Lemesle, 2004) strengthened this effect of reputation 
conveyed by private networks. But it does not imply that families pursued collective 
strategies aiming at controlling or influencing institutions or at least at being present 
inside them (in order to be informed of what was happening and able to promote the 
family’s or firm’s interests). Looking for direct successions in each institution may help 
to investigate this other question. We have seen that the only institutions with a 
significant weight of private networks were the Chamber of Commerce, the GBBF and 
maybe the Discount Council. But in fact they experienced, strictly speaking, few direct 
successions. 
The Chamber of Commerce experienced an important turnover because of rules 
limiting re-election. Such rules offer many opportunities to observe successions, but 
among ca. 320 elections to the Chamber, 20 at most (6%) may be considered as direct 
successions between relatives or associates. There was almost no succession after 
1820. They were more common in the GBBF. With the same criterion, ca. 20% of 
elections to this institution may be considered as direct successions, and they are more 
evenly distributed along time. In the case of the Discount Council, direct successions 
seem to account for less than 10% of appointments. The General Board was also the 
only place where such questions were openly spoken of in written records, with 
candidates speeches to the shareholders calling back to the former position of a father, 
brother-in-law, etc. (Plessis, 1985). Election by shareholders seems to have resulted in 
more cases of direct succession than can be found in direct cooptation (as in the 
Chamber of Commerce). Such a paradox can be explained. In the case of pure 
cooptation (or appointment), the person(s) who decide generally have access to 
information on the specific skills and individual opinions of the candidates. On the other 
hand, the shareholders were not always personally acquainted with the men they had to 
choose, may have had a more limited understanding of the nature of the GBBF’s task 
and consequently tended to trust in a family or firm name. Direct succession seems to 
be less the result of deliberate favoritism or personal acquaintance than of a lack of 
information leading to rely more heavily on symbolic assets. The kind of network built 
around the high bank (dense, but relying on “not so strong ties”) could perfectly fit such 
needs of reputational information. 
 
IV- The co-evolution of networks and institutions 
Anyway, even in the GBBF, 80% of elections cannot be defined as direct 
successions between two strongly tied persons. Even when mixing several kinds of 
private ties and various configurations of succession or simultaneous involvement in 
institutions, 70% of the members of meso-level institutions appear as isolates. And 
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even among people with at least three different institutional positions, there are still 
more than 20% of isolates. Some members were the only representatives of their 
family and firm in the world of institutions. It may have three different meanings. First, 
the size of the densely knit high-bank milieu may not have been sufficient to provide 
members to all the institutions studied. This simple explanation is questionable at least 
in the case of the GBBF and the Chamber of Commerce, and it doesn’t account for the 
evolution of the place of networks. Second, there may have been good reasons to 
include “people without networks” in the institutions; third, a choice may have been 
possible, for members of the large component, between transferring their networks in 
the institutions (by cooptating relatives or associates) and separating networks from 
institutions. 
Using such hypotheses, we can try to understand the evolution that we saw in our 
data, involving a general decline of private ties among newcomers in meso-level 
institutions (and between them and their predecessors) and the fading of the large 
component. What is difficult is to understand both the structure of opportunities (which 
institutions did exist, what they were able to provide to firms in terms of information or 
influence on economic policy, what was required to become a member in terms of skills 
or available time…) and individual or collective aims (for example, did the bankers 
want to make more profit or to retire and live like gentlemen?). It is difficult, but it helps 
to escape lazy explanations like “modernization implies less weight for private ties, 
especially kinship ties”. Finding a less dense and structured network in the last period 
does not mean that “networks do not matter anymore”, nor does the structure in the first 
years deserve to be called “archaic”. There are still families, firms (even family firms) 
and groups trying to control institutions in the end of the 19th century. But career paths, 
functional links and hierarchy between institutions have changed. 
To illustrate some aspects of the evolution leading to the image of “less networks”, I 
will concentrate on three important factors: the specialization of institutions; the 
concentration of the large component’s strategies on the Bank of France; the growing 
place of careers based on alternative resources, namely expertise and representative 
character. Then I will suggest a possible interpretation of the general evolution in terms 
of quest for information. 
Effects of the division of institutional labor 
The idea of a growing specialization among meso-level economic institutions, 
starting at the beginning of the 1830s and accelerating after 1852, is supported by 
qualitative and quantitative examination of what the institutions did as well as by data 
on individual career paths. Each institution gained new, more routine-like attributions 
and had to meet more frequently; the number of members often increased, but not in 
sufficient proportion. For example, from the 1850s onwards, the Chamber of Commerce 
had to discuss every change in railway rates and many technical questions about 
weights and measures, which left few time to the discussion of general economic 
issues. The increase in the number of cases submitted to the Commercial Court led the 
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judges to separate in more or less specialized “chambers” and to spend more time in 
the court. Each position became more time-consuming and required more specialized 
skills; it also implied more internal division of labour, which left less space for 
“generalists”. At the same time, bank itself was becoming a more specialised activity 
(more distinct from international trade or insurance for example), so that bankers were 
perhaps less praised as “experts in everything”. The notion of “expert” of each trade 
was indeed more and more used. 
In addition, new meso-level institutions were created or reinforced to deal with new 
problems, such as disputes between employers and workers or patent questions. 
Multiple involvements in many institutions seem to have become at the same time less 
common and more diverse. There was no longer a typical career path or a simple set of 
institutions, articulated around the Chamber of Commerce and the Bank of France, that 
could be “the place to be” for a densely connected economic elite. In my dataset, the 
men who entered the system after 1848 were much more likely to be elected to only 
one of the five institutions than before (table 4)xxiii. An increasing division of labor, both 
between institutions and inside each institution, meant the end of the previous complex 
institutional careers that members of the high bank network praised so much. Now they 
had to choose where to invest, and they had less arguments in terms of general 
competence to keep control on all institutions. 
Several hints point at the idea that after 1832 and even more after 1848, they 
concentrated on the GBBF or left meso-level institutions in general, sometimes to enter 
the political system more directly (the better chances that they had to become deputies 
or even ministers should not be overlooked). My micro study of the Chamber of 
Commerce showed that, although some members of prominent high-bank or tied 
families kept the influential and visible positions of president or secretary of the 
Chamber of Commerce during many years after 1832 and even after 1852, they may 
be seen as exceptions. When they opposed their colleagues on policy matters (for 
example when François Delessert advocated the law again child labor in the name of 
philanthropy or when Horace Say pointed at the importance of teaching political 
economy to merchants, two positions typical for the high bank culture of the 1800s-
1830s), there were sharp debates and they only convinced a minority. 
The few indicators that we have about the real involvement of members in 
institutional all-day work point to the same direction, showing a concentration of the 
large component on the GBBF. Although only half of the régents and censeurs (in the 
1850s and 1860s) whom Alain Plessis (1985) studied were members of the large 
component, they represented, according to his criteria, more than three quarters of the 
influential speakers on general matters, probably weighing disproportionately on the 
Bank’s policy and leaving technical, routine discussions to their colleagues. In the 
Chamber of Commerce, my study of the relationships between network position and 
involvement in all-day work points to the same direction. Among the first members of 
the Chamber who entered it in 1803, those who became the founders of the large 
component were much more active than their colleagues in subcommittees or in terms 
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of number of meetings attended each year. Despite of their multiple economic and 
institutional involvements, they found time to really participate in the Chamber’s 
advisory activity; on the contrary, their followers were less active after 1832xxiv.  
During the first decades of the century, the meso-level institutions’ attributions were 
not very clearly defined, because a new institutional system had to be created after the 
abolition of old regulations during the Revolution. But this experimental period, when 
many individuals, families and firms did not know exactly what to expect from 
membership in each institution, had an end. In fact, the evolution was rather 
incremental, even if turning points around 1832 and around 1848-1852 may be found. 
But around 1870, a new system based on increased institutional specialization was born 
that did not leave place anymore to an interaction between private networks (especially 
around the high bank) and institutional networks created by complex careers. 
The birth of chambres syndicales: a new form of organization 
If we finally concentrate on more strictly economic phenomena, how is it possible to 
understand the same evolution? “Networks” may be seen as informal institutions 
allowing to lower transaction costs and/or information asymmetries. It must be added 
that they are often very useful if you want to confiscate information. Here it may be 
argued that in a context of economic uncertainty (especially during the Empire wars, 
when trade prohibitions very often changed) as well as “institutional uncertainty” 
(uncertainty on where it was important to be present), building a network based on 
private ties between family firms and on multiple institutional involvements was very 
efficient for the high bank and the merchants and industrialists around it. Being present 
in meso-level institutions, even without controlling their decisions, may have been 
crucial to get insider information. 
In addition to information coming from the government (when it asked for advice on 
its projects, thereby revealing them) or from economic actors in general (who, when 
they asked the Discount Council for credit or when they brought their cases to the 
Commercial Court, provided information on the state of their business), meso-level 
institutions could provide information coming from the other members themselves. This 
may have been a reason to maintain a certain amount of diversity among members, 
although cooptation would have authorized one or two family firms to control the 
institutions. Including people with whom you were more remotely related (whose merit 
you knew, but with whom you did not necessarily share all interests) could allow you to 
create a kind of club in order to exchange certain kinds of information: the kind that you 
did not want to keep only for your firm, but that you did not want to become public 
either. Keeping a small place for isolates who had proved their merit (for example in the 
Commercial Court) and who could give information on specialized trades could even 
make sense. This interpretation is probably accurate for the Chamber of Commerce in 
1804-1832, when evidence shows, for example, that many informal discussions about 
topical economic issues, rumors etc. took place in the end of the meetings. 
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But this closed system did not last very long, because of changes in insiders’ 
strategies of as well as because of outsider protests. An important factor was probably 
the differentiation between banking, industry and long-distance trade, particularly with 
the increasing autonomy of “exporters” in the 1840s: they created specific clubs to 
exchange information on new markets (like China)xxv. At the same time, the idea of a 
spontaneous organization of trades was no longer associated with archaic and 
inefficient Ancien Régime traditions, but was openly discussed among economists, 
bankers etc. as well as in socialist or Christian circles (Lemercier, 2003, Kaplan and 
Minard, 2004, Rosanvallon, 2004). Even in the Chamber of Commerce, from 1849 on, 
the word “representativité” (representative character) became openly used and lists of 
candidates mentioned trade specialties. Industrial exhibitions seem also to have played 
a key role in creating ties between middle-size merchants and industrialists and making 
them think about new, unofficial organizations. The main union of unions (Union 
nationale du commerce et de l’industrie, UNCI), uniting dozens of chambres syndicales 
(form flowermaking to gas lighting) was created in 1859 as a result of these 
experiments. Along with other, isolated chambres syndicales, it managed to control 
access to the Chamber of Commerce and the Commercial Courtxxvi from ca. 1867 on. 
The choice of members had now to be based first on a balance of trade interests and 
only secondarily on personal merit. 
One of the main aims of the new chambres syndicales was to deal with information 
problems: for example, they asked their members to report on the credit situation of 
their clients, and this information was only given to other members. UNCI, thanks to its 
size, could provide many similar services: information from foreign correspondents, 
legal information and help (about insurance, patent litigation, etc.) and a laboratory for 
chemical analysis. Chambres syndicales were generally based on cooptation, so that 
they somehow kept information private, but they were more open than networks only 
based on families or firms; in the UNCI, there were even information exchanges and 
common services between various trades. It had took some time to find an institutional 
form that was neither too small (like the Cercles in the 1840s with their high annual 
dues) nor too large (you didn’t want to pay for something that everyone would have) 
and that was tolerated by the authorities, before trade unions were officially authorized. 
But it was finally created. 
At the same time, private information enterprises such as financial journals and 
services enterprises such as patent offices also multiplied from the 1830s-1840s 
onwards, and the State tried to create statistical information on the economy in general. 
It may be argued that this diversification of information sources, along with the fact that 
being a member of a meso-level institution more and more implied to concentrate on 
technical matters and less and less to enjoy discussion with other members of the elite, 
reduced the “club function” of these institutions. It raises the question of the nature of 
the new sources and ways of information exchange for high bank families: maybe the 
answer is to be sought in the new kind of selective network built by interlocking 
directorates of stock companies from the 1860s onwards. As for the new men from 
chambres syndicales, they made a different use of meso-level institutions, either as 
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forums to promote sector-based interests or as tools to create public services useful for 
small and medium business. 
Even if more private, strong ties probably kept important roles in some sectors of the 
economy, the system of meso-level institutions was less and less embedded in them; it 
relied on more impersonal notions such as représentativité and on more formal private 
organizations such as chambres syndicales. Inside the chambres syndicales, family or 
partnership ties may well have played an important role (for cooptation of new 
members, choice of the president, etc.), but this role was now concentrated at the level 
of the most basic organization. Meso-level institutions were part of a division of labour 
where what mattered was the knowledge of a particular economic sector: they were no 
longer another place to meet each other and the good place to meet some outsiders for 
high bank families. It does not mean that institutions became more “objective” or 
“efficient”: they became the place for a balance of particular interests and they still 
could provide insider information and opportunities to their individual members. But the 
boundaries between institutions and private networks were different. 
 
Conclusion 
Studying the evolution of a private network between institution members helps to 
understand the available choices and the strategies chosen in order to answer general 
problems of transaction costs reduction and information asymmetries in a changing 
economic and institutional context. I stressed the diversity of possible articulations 
between investment in private ties and in formal institutions – with the unofficial 
chambres syndicales as a mixed solution. The actors may have chosen only one of 
these strategies or tried to combine them. 
The purpose of this paper is partly methodological. Facing the growing use of the 
word “network” by historians, it may be useful to differentiate between sorts of networks 
and to investigate their origins and consequences. Assessing what formal analysis 
allows us to understand – and what it cannot do – was another aimxxvii. Quantitative 
results and graphic illustrations appear useful to retrace a global structure and to give 
some evidence on the weight of a specific network on a specific behavior. But, like 
every kind of formalization, this method is very sensitive to choices in data coding; 
more generally, it is only useful if the researcher has a substantive knowledge of the 
field. Changing scales is one interesting thing that may be done with network analysis: it 
is useful to confront the points of view of the whole structure, of small groups and of 
individuals. It requires qualitative information on each scale. 
In addition to methodological lessons, this attempt at a systematic treatment of the 
“networks question” gives original results not only about meso-level economic 
institutions and institutional careers, but also about business itself. Even in the already 
well-studied field of the high bank, it helps us to understand the limits of this milieu and 
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the chronology of its changing institutional strategies. More generally, the network study 
falsifies simple assumptions like “social capital allows election or appointment to any 
position”, allowing a more precise test of various hypothesis. 
Such a study raises questions of comparative nature. It would be very useful to 
conduct similar research particularly in smaller French cities. It has often been argued 
that the larger the city, the more anonymous the personal relationships: does this hold 
for business elites? On the other hand, information problems were probably very 
specific in Paris, which may have been the source of specific institutional strategies and 
may explain why a union of chambres syndicales appeared very early in the capital. 
More generally, my results, for example on the proportion of successions or on the 
effects of networks on election age, may serve as references for other studies that 
would address the question of notables in political or scientific institutions as well as in 
the world of business in 19th century France. An enormous work has been done in 
collecting biographies of elite members, but it is often difficult to extract general results 
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The decrease in the number of ties  
 
Date of first membership 
in any institution 
Average degree 





Degree = the number of different persons to whom the person is tied. 
 
Date of first membership 
in any institution 
Percentage with at least one 





Strong family tie = father-son, brother, grandfather-grandson, uncle-nephew, cousins. 
 
Date of first membership 
in any institution 







Date of first membership 
in any institution 







Date of first membership 
in any institution 
% isolated 
(in the whole 
network) 
% in small 
components (in the 
whole network) 
% in the large 
component (in the 
whole network) 
1785-1803 48% 15% 37% 
1804-1831 63% 14% 23% 
1832-1848 77% 13% 10% 




Percentage of the members of each institution in a given year who are tied to at 
least one member of any institution in the same year 
 
 1803 1823 1843 1863 
Chamber of Commerce 81% 60% 20% 24% 
Discount Council 38% 42% 45% 42% 
General Board of the Bank of France 33% 52% 70% 38% 
Municipal Council 30% 21% 11% 6% 
Commercial Court 22% 8% 15% 6% 
     





Percentage of the member-years of each institution due to members of the large 





















































































     
















This table takes into account the duration of stay of each member in each institution. For 
example, if one person is in the large component and spends 10 years in the Chamber of 
commerce and 20 years in the GBBF between 1800 and 1831, he will give 10 and 20 member-
years to the component; if one isolate spends only 2 years in the Commercial Court, he will give 




Percentage of the members of each institution who have also been members of a 
least one other institution 
 
Date of first membership 









Chamber of Commerce 92% 87% 97% 61% 
Discount Council 72% 67% 47% 89% 
Commercial Court 61% 39% 33% 18% 
General Board of the Bank of France 53% 68% 53% 26% 
Municipal Council 32% 34% 31% 12% 
     
Whole population 34% 28% 25% 12% 
 
People who have been members of several institutions appear in more than one line. On the 
contrary, in the whole population, they only count for one. That’s why the figures for each 
institution and for the whole population may not seem consistent at first glance. 
 
Key to the labels used in the network graphs 
 
Label Last Name First Names 
aguesseau Aguesseau d' Henri Cardin Jean Baptiste 
akermann Akermann François Adolphe 
albert Albert de Luynes d' Louis Joseph Charles Amable 
aligre Aligre d' Etienne Jean François Charles 
andrea André Louis Alfred 
andred André Dominique Isabeau 
ardoin Ardoin Jacques Augustin Joseph Anne 
argout Argout d' Antoine Maurice 
argoutp Argout d' Apollinaire Antoine Maurice 
aubeag Aubé Ambroise guillaume 
aubég Aubé Guillaume 
audenf Audenet fils  
audenp Audenet père Jean 
bacot Bacot  
baile Bailllière Emile 
bailjb Bailllière Jean Baptiste 
bartholdi Bartholdi Jacques Frédéric 
bastar Bastarrèche Pierre Léon 
baudon Baudon Pascal 
bayvet Bayvet Francois Pierre 
bazin Bazin Charles 
beau Beau  
beaua Beau Alexis Emilien 
beauj Beau jeune  
bellange Bellangé Pierre Louis 
berard Berard Auguste Simon Louis 
berthier Berthier Charles Louis 
bertin Bertin-Devaux Louis Francois 
bidermann Bidermann Jacques 
billiet Billiet Pierre Joseph 
boigues Boigues Louis 
boisgelin Boisgelin de Alexandre César Joseph 
boschf Boscheron fils Guillaume 
boschj Boscheron Jacques Guillaume Raphaël 
boullee Boullée Claude 
breton Breton Louis Henri 
bricogne Bricogne Athanase Jean Baptiste 
brochant Brochant  
buffault Buffault Alphonse Jean 
busoni Busoni fils  
camba Cambacérès de Marie Pierre Jean Hubert 
cardon Cardon Jean Bernard 
carié Carié Henry Liévain 
carré Carré  
caylus Cailus Louis Clément 
caylusb Caylus baron  
chaptal Chaptal Jean Baptiste Marie 
charmet Charmet Antoine 
cheuvF Cheuvreux François Casimir 
cheuvJPC Cheuvreux Jean Pierre Casimir 
chevals Chevals Jacques Philippe 
christofle Christofle  
 
collart Collart-Dutilleul Alexandre Jules 
collette Collette de Baudicour Théodule 
cordier Cordier Louis Francois 
cottier Cottier Adolphe Pierre Francois 
cousté Cousté Joseph Désiré 
cretet Crétet cte de Champmol Emmanuel 
darbar Darblay Auguste Rodolphe (aîné) 
darbas Darblay Aime Stanislas (jeune) 
davihen Davillier Joseph Henri 
davijc Davillier Jean Charles Joachim 
davijj Davillier Jean Antoine Joseph (aîné) 
delaistre Delaistre Bernard Jean Etienne Raymond 
delaroche Delaroche Hippolyte dit Paul 
delesb Delessert Jules Paul Benjamin 
delesF Delessert Francois Marie 
delesx Delessert  
delon Delon Louis 
deltuf Deltuf Antoine Octave 
denièreg Deniere Guillaume 
denièrej Denière Jean-François 
desnoeux Desnoeux de Saint-Julien Jérôme Charles Georges 
desprez Desprez Médard 
didot Didot Ambroise Firmin 
didotp Didot (Firmin-) Paul 
dommartin Dommartin  
doyen Doyen Charles Martin 
doyenb Doyen (baron) Charles Pierre 
ducos Ducos Joseph Basile 
dupont Dupont de Nemours Pierre Samuel 
dupuytrem Dupuytrem Louis 
durand Durand François Marie Adolphe 
duvidal Duvidal de Montferrier Jean Jacques Philippe Marie 
eichthal Eichthal d' Adolphe 
etignc Etignard de Lafaulotte Claude Louis Simon 
etignf Etignard de Lafaulotte fils 
evette Evette fils  
feray Feray Ernest 
fere Fere Victor Hyacinthe 
ferrere Ferrere-laffitte  
filliettaz Filliettaz Marc Jacob 
flory Flory Guillaume Henry 
fontenill Fontenillat H Frédéric 
foulda Fould Achille/ père 
fouldb Fould Benoit 
gailleton Gailleton Joseph 
ganneron Ganneron Auguste Victor Hippolyte 
germain Germain Jean Pierre 
germi Germiny Lebegue cte de Charles 
germia Germiny de Adolphe 
gibert Gibert Guillaume Toussaint 
gisquet Gisquet Henri Joseph 
gouin Gouin Ernest Alexandre 
goupy Goupy Guillaume Louis Isidore 
gros Gros  
guerin Guérin de Foncin Jean Francois 
 
guiton Guiton Barthelemy 
guyotd Guyot Delisle Sébastien 
guyotv Guyot de Villeneuve 
guyotvf Guyot de Villeneuve François Pierre 
hachj Hachette Jean Georges 
hachl Hachette Louis 
hacquart Hacquart André-François 
halpha Halphen Anselme 
halphg Halphen Germain 
halphj Halphen Joseph 
halphl Halphen Georges Léopold 
harcourt Harcourt d' Charles Louis Hector 
hotth Hottinguer Henri 
hottjc Hottinguer Jean Conrad 
hottr Hottinguer baron Rodolphe 
jacqui Jacquinot de Pampelune Claude François Joseph Catherine 
jame Jame Jean Baptiste 
jardin Jardin jeune  
jouetj Herman Antoine Edouard ou Edmond 
jouett Jouet Théodore 
labbe Labbé Louis 
laborde Laborde de Louis Joseph Alexandre 
laffitte Laffitte Jacques 
lafondan Lafond Antoine Narcisse 
lafonde Lafond Etienne 
lafondr Lafond Ernest 
lahure Lahure Louis Auguste 
lamoignon Lamoignon de Anne Pierre Chrétien 
lanque Lanquetin Elie 
lanquj Lanquetin Jacques Séraphin 
larreguy Larreguy J 
lasteyrie Lasteyrie du Saillant de Ferdinand Charles Léon 
latteux Latteux Louis 
lebaudy Lebaudy Gustave 
lebeuf Lebeuf Louis Martin 
lecou Le Couteulx Canteleu Jean Barthélémy 
lefebf Lefebvre Jacques Gérard Francis 
lefebj Lefebvre François Gilbert Jacques 
legentil Legentil Charles 
legrandv Legrand de Villiers Auguste Louis Adèle 
lemercier Lemercier de Nerville JJ 
lesguilliez Lesguilliez Charles 
lesourd Lesourd Louis 
letellier Letellier-Delafosse Pierre Louis 
littré Littré Maximilien Paul Emile 
malleta Mallet Alphonse 
malletg Mallet de Chalmassy Guillaume 
malletj Mallet James (Adolphe Jacques) 
mapu Martin Puech Jean Henry 
marchand Marchand Louis 
marmetj Marmet Jean Louis Ambroise 
marmetp Marmet Paulin 
mfa Martin fils d'André Claude Etienne 
michel Michel de Trétaigne Jean Baptiste 
millescamps Millescamps Louis Théophile 
 	
milliet Milliet Gratien 
moreauf Moreau Frédéric 
moreaufp Moreau père Frédéric 
moreaule Moreau Louis Ernest 
moreaulv Moreau Louis Victor 
moreaumf Moreau Martin Ferdinand 
mozet Mozet Hyacinthe Charles 
noel Noel Desvergers Marin 
odiera Odier Antoine 
odierj Odier James (Jacques Antoine) 
ollivier Ollivier Augustin Charles Alexandre 
outrequin Outrequin Francois Jacques 
paillard Paillard Victor Alexandre 
paillot Paillot Pierre 
payen Payen Alphonse 
pénicaud Pénicaud Alphonse 
perdonnet Perdonnet  
perierc Perier Casimir Pierre 
periercl Perier Claude 
perierj Perier André Jean Joseph 
perierjc Périer Jacques Constantin 
periers Perier Antoine Scipion 
perreel Perree Louis Ferdinand 
perreep Perrée Pierre Nicolas 
perregaux Perregaux Jean Frédéric 
pierlot Pierlot Louis 
pillot Pillot aîné  
piwi Pillet-Will Michel Frédéric 
piwif Pillet-Will Frédéric 
piwih Pillet-Will Hyacinthe Louis Alexis Constant 
quatremere Quatremère de Quincy Antoine Chrysostome 
raimbert Raimbert Estave 
ravaut Ravaut François Louis 
rémusat Rémusat de  Charles François Marie 
renouAC Renouard Augustin 
renouAd Renouard Adrien 
renouJ Renouard Jules 
riant Riant Leon Louis 
ricard Ricard Georges Antoine 
ricord Ricord  
robillard Robillard Jacques Florent 
rodier Rodier  
roman Roman Jacques 
rothschild Rothschild de Alphonse 
rougemont Rougemont  
rousseau Rousseau Jean Joseph 
roux Roux Vital 
sabatier Sabatier Guillaume 
sanson Sanson Davillier Alexandre Joseph Toussaint 
saulty Saulty de Philippe 
sayC Say Constant 
sayH Say Horace Emile 
sayJB Say Jean Baptiste 
scherer Scherer Daniel Henry 
sevene Sévène Jean Auguste 
 
soehnée Soehnée Jean Michel 
tattet Tattet aîné  
templier Templier  
tercha Ternaux Charles 
tergui Ternaux Guillaume Louis (aîné) 
terlou Ternaux Louis Mortimer 
terrou Ternaux-Rousseau / Ternaux aîné Nicolas 
thibon Thibon Louis Charles 
thomas Thomas Nicolas Toussaint 
thory Thory  
tonnel Le Tonnelier de Breteuil Achille Charles Stanislas Emile 
valois Valois Auguste Jacques Omer (jeune) 
valoisa Valois aîné  
vassal Vassal Jacques Claude Roman 
vassalf Vassal fils Antoine 
vernes Vernes Charles 
vial Vial Joseph Marie 
vignon Vignon Pierre 
waru Waru de Adolphe 
Graph 1: Ties father-son, brothers, grandfather-grandson, uncle-nephew, cousins and marriage ties (black nodes = largest component) 
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Graph 8: All kinds of ties among members in charge in 1823 
 




Graph 9: All kinds of ties among members in charge in 1863 
 




     !"#!$ %"






























	0 ) <! ) : /














































     




































   








) %>) %' 4  !    )%   %%
%>))%!'




 4 % ! % !)
 %% )  %     ' 4 8!)
)  8  %    * )  )  )%'







!*)/<%0   ! 1
' 4*+,,'!'%,.,)!! )
%!)!)/#'"
			K#"0'

